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"We cannot study the individual separate from the environment, or the environment separate from the individual. All crime prevention currently being carried out limits the problem of crime prevention to the physical environment."

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C. Ray Jeffery; Sept.1999

"CPTED? Yeah, it's all good stuff, but it's all about housing estates isn't it."

COMMUNITY SAFETY EUROPE

- A British Transport Police Architectural Liaison Officer

## <u>Crime in Context – the Transport Network</u> in London

- London Underground facilitating 4 million
   passenger journeys per day
- Only c.30,000 recorded crimes per year (in all categories)

  Currently running at less than 1 robbery per day
- Criminal Damage falling despite better reporting

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• Despite this, fear of crime still a challenge

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### <u>Crime in Context – The Transport Network</u> in London

- London Buses providing 6.5 million passenger journeys per day
- Only c.14 crimes per million passenger journeys
  This is all categories, including Criminal Damage
  Initial spike in stats following introduction of free price for schoolchildren now returned to below 2006

  Only c.14 crimes per million passenger journeys
  This is all categories.

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• Criminal damage being specifically targeted through Operation BusTag

# THE TEN PRINCIPLES OF CRIME REDUCTION

- Target hardening
- Target removal
- Remove the means to commit crime
  - Reduce the payoff
- Access control
   Surveillance/visibility
- Environmental design
- Rule setting
- Increase the risk of being caught
- Deflect offenders



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# TARGET HARDENING Selected materials

Amendments to engineering Standards




o adopting "low tech" fixes for high tech problems






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
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







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








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### **ZONED PERMEABILITY**

Secondary Revenue: Customer Amenity or Crime Generator?

Often impossible to separate the two effects

Offen impossible to separate the two effects

Offen impossible to separate the two effects

Offen impossible to separate the two effects

- Cannot ignore the strong business case for secondary revenue generators
- Therefore necessary to "design-in" mitigating factors to reduce risk
- Crime may not be the only imperative

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### **ZONED PERMEABILITY**

Section 17 Crime and Disorder Act 1998 says:

"Without prejudice to any other obligation imposed upon it, it shall be the duty of each authority... to exercise its various functions with due regard to the likely effect of the exercise of those functions en, and the need to do all that it reasonably can to prevent crime and disorder in this area."

 Police and Justice Act 2006 included anti-social behaviour, drug and substance misuse in the definition

### **ZONED PERMEABILITY**


Transport Locations – Defensible Space, or just areas for Surveillance?

Are TfL staff Capable Guardians?


Possible to create "sense" of ownership by TfL – a "managed environment" applying CPTED tools:


Symbolic barriers/delineatio

- Perimeters
- Surveillance (Natural, Staff and CCTV)
- Design & Layout (customer usage, clear lines of sight)
- Cleanliness (Litter clearance, graffiti removal)
- Lighting/Décor
- Legibility (clear signage, the Tube map!)




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### WHY ARE HUBS SO CRITICAL?

■ What is a "Hub"? The TfL Context:

4 million passenger journeys per weekday – LU 6.5 passenger journeys per weekday – London

Crucial inter-modal interchanges facilitating HUPE complex journeys around the city

- Essential for London commerce and TfL future planning

### PERSONAL SECURITY AT HUBS

■ The "crime context"

Many inner-city hubs often form a part of local streetorime "hotspots"

Why? Rational Choice Theory
- Choice/vulnerability of victions FETY EUROPE

Risk of apprehension/arrest

- Likely reward

- Multitude of factors influencing decision

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### THE TFL APPROACH

- Based firmly in a partnership approach
- No single agency holds all the tools to reduce or prevent crime & ASB
- Essential that a systematic, collaborative approach is adopted for sustainable effects HDPE
- Embodied in "Hub Action Plans"



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### **HUB ACTION PLANS**

- Audit crime & disorder in clearly defined "footprint" area
  - Carry out Environmental Visual Audit
- Identify hub users and residents & consult on priorities
- Qualified specialists in crime reduction identify interventions and key players
- Engage and implement interventions

### **HUB ACTION PLANS (CONT'D.)**

- Monitor implementation of interventions on regular basis
- Report to key players on progress
- Evaluate after agreed period (12 months min.)
   Feedback/review/reconsult
- Refresh plan and continue

### THE RESULTS

- HAP's contributors to 9 successive years of transport-related crime reductions
  - Crime rate on transport in London down to 6 crimes per million passenger journeys in April 2015 (8.6 in April 2013) TV AFETY TUROPE
  - Specific hubs in challenging areas showing good performance on identified priorities

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### WHAT "DROVE" TFL'S NEED FOR INCREASED **VIGILANCE FROM ITS STAFF?**

- Mayoral Priority "Getting it right for London"
- London 2012 is the World's first public transport Olympics..." Shaun McCarthy – Chairman, Independent Commission for a Sustainable London 2012
- ime is bad for business
- Legal obligation
- Crime prevention saves money

### THE DEMAND CHALLENGE

· Predictions of huge increases in already stretched travel demand

• We knew that DLR carried 500,000 passengers on 30/7/12 - 65% increase from normal levels



# THE FLAWS IN THE PROCESS Already "embedded" security processes against "traditional" threat Airport-style security not practical in Tube environment Even if they were, would only prompt early detonation Those responsible for checks merely additional victims Best chance – identify Hostile Reconnaissance

# WHAT'S OUT THERE? Behavioural Assessment Screening System Delivers awareness techniques Geared towards "Capable Guardians" Usually "owned" by police and Border Agency

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### WHAT IS "I STARED"?

 A system which enables a member of any public-facing staff group to become proficient in identifying illegal or otherwise "nefarious" intent, thus increasing vigilance capacity

A means by which such staff can challenge their own or their organisation's stereotypes to ensure completely reasoned (and therefore justiliable) responses and interventions

An accredited system of training in relevant, proven crime prevention principles to facilitate the above in a way that maximises the likelihood of success, particularly in busy, complex environments (such as London's public transport system)

### **HOW IS "I STARED" DIFFERENT?**

■ Academically accredited – unlike all other courses found

Delivers all the usual baseline behaviour recognition tools PLUS applicable basic crime prevention theory

Enables recipients to recognise situational factors in their location that are likely to influence the decisions made by those with criminal intent

■ Tailored to include site-specific "what to do next" advice

### **HOW WAS THE TRAINING DELIVERED?**

 TfL invested in a 2 year "Training for Trainers" licence, delivered via 9 TfL crime prevention staff reaching the accreditation criteria

Over 3400 staff trained in run-up to Olympics – Olympic Travel Ambassadors and enforcement staff

 Legacy continuing with operational staff training continuing for duration of the licence – which has been extended for a further 2 years

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
### **TERRORISM: WHO IS A RISK?**

There is no useful profile to assist law enforcement or intelligence to predict who will follow this trajectory of radicalization.


Rather, the individuals who take this course per begin as "unremarkable" from various walks of life.


(Sibler and Bhatt, 2007)





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# I. S.T.A.R.E.D.© TRAINING FOR TFL TRAINERS – COURSE CONTENT

Day One:

- Introduction to and rationale for I.S.T.A.R.E.D.©
- What do we know about terrorism?
- How crime prevention works Rational Choice Theory
- The 10 basic principles of crime prevention
   Think offender/terrorist
- Environmental cues/Broken Windows theory
- Situational advice
- Traditional threats E.V.I.L.D.O.N.E /new threats (mass human casualties)
- CCTV sighting and capabilities

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# I. S.T.A.R.E.D.© TRAINING FOR TFL TRAINERS – COURSE CONTENT

### Day Two:

- Why am I suspicious? The effects of non-verbal communications

  Establishing baselines of behaviour in a selected location

  Questioning techniques who, where, what, why, when,
- What do I do next? Essential reporting components
- Case studies/visual review



## WHY AM I SUSPICIOUS? THE EFFECTS OF NVC'S


Words are not the only means of communication



- Facial expressions found to be universal yet only 50 out of 20,000 found to be able to recognise deception without formal training (Paul Ekman, 1972)
- Wordless signals can assist with assessing veracity through questions asked, and can influence resultant actions

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NONVERBAL BEHAVIOUR	INTERPRETATION	
Brisk, erect and direct walk	Confidence	
Standing with hands on hips	Readiness, aggression	
Arms crossed on chest	Defensiveness	
Walking with hands in pockets, shoulders hunched	Miserable/ lack of confidence	
Hand to cheek	Evaluation, thinking	
Touching, slightly rubbing nose	Rejection, doubt, lying	
Hands clasped behind back	Self Control	
Tapping or drumming fingers	Impatience	
Pulling or tugging at ear	Indecision	
Open palm	Sincerity, openness, innocence	




## WHAT DO I DO NEXT? - ESTABLISHING REPORTING PROCESSES


■ For I. S.T.A.R.E.D.© to be fully effective it is essential that, having identified a risk, the staff involved know exactly what to do next

Therefore necessary for trainers to make a full evaluation of the reporting mechanisms available to trainees in their workplace setting – course "tailoring"

Always best to avoid the creation of additional tiers of reporting process – K.I.S.S. – consider laminated wallet card "aides memoires" etc. for reporting process

Consult with managers, then match process to emergency/ intelligence service lines of communication







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### THE RESULTS?

Success measurable only through overall crime levels during games

6% reduction in overall crime levels

Zero terrorist alerts during the games FETY LUROPE

- Anecdotal evidence from staff of direct application of the training on the ground
- Also reported greater confidence in liaising with police as a result of the training

### TO SUMMARISE ...

- There are many pathways to extremism
- Similarly, there is no single profile on an individual who may be more susceptible to radicalisational.
- Perpetrators have been found to differ in many PF respects including their background both religious and social, education levels, socialisation and life experiences.
- No single trigger, situation or profile fits all.

### MAXIMISING IMPACTS

- TfL funding training for Roads & Transport Policing Command PCSO's, PC's and Sergeants in Basic Crime Prevention & Problem
- Solving
  1000 trained in accredited course by Feb 2015 pp
  Hamessing "eyes and ears" of TfL staff —
  Accredited "I STARED" behavioural
  assessment training where to look and what
  to look for



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